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Introduction
There was a remarkable increase in attention given to ethical issues concern-
ing technology in the second half of the previous century. This increase fol-
lowed the deepening societal impact of technology, and the growing insight
into its benefits as well as its potential for disaster. More or less parallel to this
development in ethics, sociological studies started to delve empirically into
the contextual development of the substance of science and technology. This
latter move from the philosophy of technology towards a more empirical type
of science and technology studies has lead to a growing interest in everyday
practicalities of technology development. However, science and technology
studies do not simply open up new theoretical avenues.We shall demonstrate
that they also confront moral philosophers with some tough challenges.
Until recently, the moral philosophy of technology could be roughly divid-
ed into an Anglo-Saxon and a Continental tradition (Mitcham and Nis-
senbaum ). Within the former tradition, especially in the United States,
the ethical approach has been intimately connected with efforts made by the
administration to watch over technology by means of technology assess-
ment. The main focus in this policy has been on the just distribution of the
costs, benefits and risks of particular technological developments. In sharp
contrast, the Continental tradition focussed on the cultural and moral conse-
quences of the general dominance of technology in Western societies, and on
the possible rise of a quasi-totalitarian technocracy. The keyword here is
alienation, i.e., the situation where the subject is ruled by the object, that is,
man is governed by technology of his own making. The conflict between in-
strumentalist and substantive conceptions of technology formed the issue of
the debate between the traditions. In the former conception, technology is a
value-neutral instrument that has to be wielded wisely and fairly. In the latter,
modern technology embodies substantive values like control and manipula-
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tion. For that reason, existing technology has to be condemned as a whole
and, if possible, replaced by an alternative, less dominating type.
In recent years both traditions have come under attack for their frequent a
priori and monistic conception of technology and for their rather determin-
istic view of technology development. Critics maintain that both philosophi-
cal traditions neglect the internal workings of technology development, its
contingency, the social influences that co-determine it, and its man-made
character in general. As a result of this, both traditions lack the conceptual
means for developing a strategy of effective control, waking up – as it were –
with the hellhounds at the door. Therefore, philosophers of technology in
general, and ethicists in particular, are advised to listen carefully to their col-
leagues from the sociology of science and technology (De Vries ). Their
“science and technology studies” open up wide vistas on the inner workings
of technology development.What becomes visible makes the traditional phi-
losophy of technology difficult to maintain.
This sociological opening-up of the “black box” of technology finds its
counterpart in the efflorescence of what is now called “engineering ethics”.
This type of applied ethics not only deals with the results of technology – leav-
ing the content of technology development securely to the minds and hands
of engineers – but also with the practice of technology-in-the-making as well.
If technology is man-made, then, in principle, man can be expected to make
conscious and ethical choices about the course of its development. The mis-
sion of engineering ethics is the amelioration of the practical choices engi-
neers make, by introducing moral standards and emphasising ethical skills.
Engineering ethics is a form of professional ethics. It directs itself towards en-
gineers because they are the primary actors in the technology venture. It is
they who design and develop the hardware (and, increasingly, also the soft-
ware) and command the necessary technical expertise. As experts, they are in
a privileged position to foresee and assess the possible consequences of their
technologies. When sufficiently trained in ethics, so the assumption goes,
they will utilise their influence to make better technology with less undesir-
able consequences for society and the environment. Thus, the core business
of engineering ethics can be characterised as helping and motivating engineers
to take their professional responsibilities to heart. In the meantime, this trend
has reached the policy makers. For instance, in the early s, the Dutch Par-
liament asked the Minister of Science and Education to ensure that young en-
gineers receive an education in ethics (see Ritzen ).
However, in a recent, thought-provoking article, William Lynch and
Ronald Kline () took a critical look at an important current within mod-
ern engineering ethics. As a discipline, engineering ethics examines and dis-
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cusses issues as diverse as the avoidance of conflicts of interests, the protection
of trade secrets and confidentiality, the right to dissent,professional responsi-
bility,and the obligation to protect public safety,health,and welfare.But how-
ever broad this range of issues, much of engineering ethics has been directed
towards ensuring “that engineers meet their obligation to the public … re-
gardless of any pressures they may encounter in a corporate environment.
Whether emphasising individual moral reasoning or professionally norma-
tive standards, engineering ethicists have been particularly concerned to help
ensure that the engineering will resist social pressures on the job”(Lynch and
Kline , ). In particular, engineering ethics focusses on cases of so-
called“whistle blowing”.In such cases,we meet responsible engineers who en-
tertain grave doubts about the safety of a particular new technological proj-
ect.But they are often overruled by managers who wave aside these doubts be-
cause they are propelled by conflicting goals like their own or the company’s
reputation, the financial consequences of not meeting contractual obliga-
tions towards associates,and so on.The dilemma is always whether individual
engineers should make their knowledge of immanent disaster public, even
though, by doing so, they break their vow of loyalty and confidentiality to-
wards their employer and, more likely than not, suffer great personal cost.
Lynch and Kline wonder how much heroism we can expect from responsi-
ble engineers. Taking their cue explicitly from modern science and technolo-
gy studies, they argue that engineering ethics would do better by paying “at-
tention to the complexities of engineering practice that shape decisions on a
daily basis”. In this way, engineering ethics will help engineers “to identify fea-
tures of their everyday practice that could contribute to ethically problematic
outcomes before clear-cut ethical dilemmas arise” (). Safety risks do not
spring up overnight but are generally the result of a slow and gradual process
that can and should be influenced by responsible – not heroic – engineers.
The authors offer willing engineers ways to be responsible without having to
be a (semi-suicidal) hero.
Our primary interest here is not so much Lynch and Kline’s advice to engi-
neers but rather why engineering ethicists are so keen on whistle blowing.Ac-
cording to Lynch and Kline, it is “the focus on individual or professional au-
tonomy [that] can lead to an excessive focus on the conflict between engineers
and management” (-). In our view, it is not the focus on autonomy that
leads to this pre-occupation with whistle blowing, but rather the focus on the
moral responsibility of engineers. Engineering ethics addresses responsible
engineers, and it seeks to elaborate this sense of responsibility. Cases of whis-
tle blowing are well suited to support this pursuit. This can be seen as follows.
Moral responsibility is a core theme of moral philosophy. For our purpose,
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however, we do not have to go into all the complexities of the debate. To be re-
sponsible for something is broadly understood as to be answerable for it. But
one is not always answerable for everything. To be answerable, certain condi-
tions have to be met. According to most moral philosophers, and to most
people in ordinary life as well, individuals can be held responsible, that is an-
swerable or accountable, for their actions (and the consequences), if four con-
ditions are met:
 To consider an actor responsible, s/he should be imputable. Imputability is
most commonly understood as being in possession of one’s rational capabili-
ties at the moment one performed the imputed action. This condition is well
known in everyday experience. When someone wrongs us, we blame him or
her and ask for compensation, apologies, or punishment. However, if a child,
or someone suffering from a delirium, hurts us, we do not take him or her to
be accountable in the normal sense. We do not blame the child or the mad-
man, for “s/he did not know what s/he was doing”.
 The actor should actually have performed the action for which s/he is con-
sidered responsible. We stop blaming someone if s/he convinces us that, in
fact, s/he did not execute the action that hurt us. In severe cases,a third party –
such as a court or a jury – is summoned to find out the truth about these facts.
Of course, it is equally possible to hold someone responsible for not having
acted in a situation where s/he should have acted.
 The actor should have acted on his or her own free will, i.e., should not have
been under external pressure or hindered by circumstances outside his/her
control. If someone breaks a promise to meet us at a certain time, we do not
hold this against him/her if it turns out that, on the way, s/he was abducted or
had an accident. Sometimes this condition is not recognised as a separate
condition but is considered as implied in the first condition. In that case, a re-
sponsible person is understood as being rational and free. However, for our
purposes, we prefer to differentiate rationality and free will.
 The actor can only be held responsible for the consequences of his/her ac-
tions if these were or could have been foreseen. Few people will blame Diesel
for the environmental problems caused by automobiles with diesel engines.
These four conditions spell out the conception of moral responsibility that
(rightly) prevails in ethics and common sense in general.
It is now easy to see that cases of whistle blowing fit in quite well with this
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conception of moral responsibility. In such cases, most of the four conditions
are met. The brave engineer is – of course – rational, s/he can be the clear and
definite cause of a particular consequence (by going public, s/he ensures that
our safety will not be put in danger),and it is by and large foreseeable what the
outcome of this action will be (the danger will be averted, the company criti-
cised). Only one condition is not met. There is considerable (moral) pressure
exercised on individual engineers to keep their mouths shut. They are not
free. So it is toward this condition proper that most of the attention in engi-
neering ethics is directed.
How instructive and even inspiring whistle blowing may be, arguments
that situations like these exhaust the moral dimension of engineering hardly
carry conviction. To force the issue: by focussing on whistle blowing, engineer-
ing ethics evades the real problem. Within the practice of modern technology, the
cases in which the four conditions for individual moral responsibility are met – if
ever – are the exceptional ones. The outcome of much sociological research in
science and technology radically undermines the prevailing, commonsense
conception of individual moral responsibility that also underlies engineering
ethics.To make this clear,we shall go through the four conditions of moral re-
sponsibility once again.
The first condition is left untouched by science and technology studies. No
one argues that engineers are out of their mind. However, science and tech-
nology studies do interfere with the remaining three conditions of moral re-
sponsibility. The second condition prescribes that the actor actually per-
formed the action for which s/he is held accountable. In the case of engineers,
the determination of this causality is not as easy as it may seem. Modern engi-
neers are, more often than not, relatively small cogs in a large and complex
machine. Therefore, when some consequences of new technologies turn out
to be less desirable than expected, it is generally impossible to relate these
consequences to the actions of specific engineers in a straightforward man-
ner. As technology studies have repeatedly shown, modern technology is es-
sentially a collective and complex enterprise. However, individual engineers
are not usually only small cogs, they are also relatively powerless ones. They
typically work in hierarchical organisations and have little room to follow
their own choices. Thus, the third condition – about freedom to act – is not
met either. Finally, the fourth condition holds that a person can only be held
responsible for the consequences if those were or could have been foreseen.
But science and technology studies have shown that it is hard, if not impossi-
ble, to predict with any accuracy the future consequences of new technologies
for society and the environment (e.g., see Collingridge ).
Thus, if we follow the sociologists, the conditions for moral responsibility
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are seldom, if ever, met inside the modern techno-scientific enterprise.With-
in such an environment, it is not only hard but also often impossible to as-
cribe moral responsibility to individual actors. Therefore, engineering ethics
is in constant danger of committing moralism. By this we mean the attitude of
burdening individuals with moral demands and responsibilities they cannot
possibly meet. There is also the connected danger of naively expecting engi-
neers to assume their responsibility actively. In its passive (or retrospective)
form, responsibility equals liability or accountability. On the other hand, in
its active (or prospective) form, responsibility is seen as a desirable character
trait, as a virtue. An actively responsible person has an acute sense of his/her
duties, performs them well, and shows vision. But how strong is the motiva-
tion of an anonymous cog, without real power or foresight, to behave respon-
sibly in this active sense? Not very strong, one would expect.
Our main contention is that engineering ethics should directly reflect the
problematic status of individual moral responsibility, instead of skipping this
important issue by orienting all its attention to those rare cases where most
conditions for realising this moral responsibility are met. If it continues to do
so, engineering ethics not only runs the risk of neglecting the major part of
normal engineering practice, but also exposes itself to the associated danger
of unwittingly molding situations to make them fit the contours of moral in-
dividual responsibility. The case of the Challenger disaster is a case in point
here. But Kline and Lynch’s solution does not seem very satisfactory either.
Even though they correctly chastise mainstream engineering ethics for its
too-narrow focus on whistle blowing, they only focus upon the symptom.
They overlook the underlying cause of this narrow focus: the desire to find
situations in engineering practice that do fit the bill of individual moral re-
sponsibility with which ethicists are so comfortable. This means they stay
within the bounds of mainstream engineering ethics by assuming that the
use of science and technology studies will leave unscathed the core of engi-
neering ethics, the individual conception of moral responsibility.
In the following, we shall take up the challenge of science and technology
studies with regard to engineering ethics. However, we shall not argue that an
individual notion of moral responsibility is obsolete, and engineering ethics
along with it. Ultimately, any normative reflection on the development of
modern technology has to address the responsibility of actors, i.e., individu-
als. Human actors can act responsibly, networks cannot.
Therefore, a normative approach to science and technology cannot say
goodbye to moral responsibility. But its content and its scope will have to be
re-thought in the light of the findings of modern science and technology
studies. We want to contribute to this re-thinking by presenting an empirical
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study showing the changing role of moral responsibility in a normal engi-
neering practice. Our research for this study is based on data that were col-
lected at our university during the s (see next section).
With this study, we aim to supply evidence that the lack of incentive for
moral behaviour in engineering is not a property of modern technology-in-
the-making as such. It is, to a large degree, the consequence of the specific way
this technology-in-the-making is organised. If this organisation is changed
properly, the way moral responsibility is exercised by engineers may also
change, and may become more productive. Therefore, an engineering ethics
that takes the moral responsibility of engineers to heart should not omit re-
flection upon organisational reforms that could clear away the current im-
pediments to practising individual moral responsibility in engineering.
Research approach and data
We carried out our research in a number of steps that are followed through in
the structure of the study presented below:
Starting research at the level of individuals
As we argued above, individuals have to play one role or another in the moral
steering of technology. Therefore, it is legitimate to start our argument at this
individual level. However, to avoid moralism, it is of the utmost importance
to keep in touch with the conceptions of moral responsibility brought for-
ward by the moral agents themselves – the engineers. They can be safely as-
sumed to have their own ideas on responsibility – because they have the most
interest in doing so. Apart from this matter of principle, there is also a more
pragmatic reason to start with what individual engineers have to say. If a the-
oretical conception of moral responsibility is to have any chance at all of be-
ing accepted by its addressees, this conception should be developed in a dia-
logue with them. This is not a hollow courtesy. In a recent study, Radder has
pointed out that bioengineers are highly critical of suggestions offered to
them by moral philosophers for the ethical improvement of their technologi-
cal practices (Radder ).
Collecting and analysing empirical data
To portray the moral agents, we sought empirical answers to the question
concerning the way in which engineers themselves reflect on their responsi-
bility as techno-scientists. Scanning the literature on ethical aspects of engi-
neering practice delivered no systematic data about typical ways in which
practising engineers think about their social responsibility.Fortunately,how-
ever, we did have access to a modest but interesting data set collected during
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the course of an experimental impact assessment project – called , i.e.,
Social Effects of Scientific Research – at our university (University of
Twente). This is a university consisting of a number of large technical depart-
ments on the one side, and smaller schools of philosophy, social sciences, and
business on the other.
The  project started in  and continued on through the s. Its
objective was to develop measures for stimulating discussion about the social
effects of technical research – either planned or already in progress – at our
university. The  project was initiated in reaction to the conclusion of a
highly controversial research contract between a research group in the Tech-
nical Physics Department and Urenco, a nearby uranium-enrichment facili-
ty. Through this contract, the university became linked to applied research in
laser enrichment of uranium in a business context. Particularly the potential
military applications of this kind of research triggered excitement about this
contract in the university community and in the local press. This excitement
can be understood from the fact that, at the beginning of the s, the uni-
versity had declared – by a decision of the Board – that it would not engage in
research with military applications. To neutralise the controversy resulting
from the Urenco contract, the Board of the University launched the 
project (see Jelsma and Van de Poel ). In the framework of this project,
scientists in the technical departments (mostly engineers) were interviewed
about their views on the social responsibility of practitioners. These inter-
views are the primary source of data for our research.
Typical statements by the interviewees are presented in the first part of the
study.This is done by arranging these statements according to the four condi-
tions of moral responsibility as spelled out in the introduction. In the second
part, we critically appraise the engineers’ opinions against the same condi-
tions, and we question the tenability of these conditions in the context of a
modern academic research setting.
Extending the scope of research beyond the individual level 
The inclusion of societal criteria in matters concerning the funding of uni-
versity research programs – one of the measures resulting from the 
project – opened the opportunity to investigate whether these criteria influ-
enced the way in which questions of societal responsibility were handled
and research decisions were made. We studied this aspect at the research-
team level, and report on it in the third part, in a concise case study on the
choices made within a research project on biodegradable plastics within our
university. We derived the data for this study from an investigation carried
out by one of our graduate students (Schaareman ). This investigation is
based on in-depth interviews with technical scientists involved in the proj-
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ect, especially the project leader and the Ph.D. student who carried out the
research.
Connecting the individual and institutional level
In the final section, we connect both levels of moral action in terms of an in-
centive structure at the university level, setting the stage for the moral agency
of individual scientists.
Interviews with engineers about their responsibility as technical
scientists
In presenting the interview results, we shall leave aside the rather trivial first
condition for moral responsibility, i.e., rationality, for the simple reason that
it is never seen as a problem in the case of engineers. Thus, to be attributed
moral responsibility or to accept it, the three remaining conditions are:
A the actor has to have acted, s/he had to be the cause of the consequences;
B s/he has to have acted freely and willingly; and 
C s/he has to have done so knowingly – both with reference to the relevant
facts of the case and with reference to the relevant norms and values. The en-
gineer should at least have been in the position to acquire sufficient knowl-
edge about the consequences of his/her professional actions and their
(un)desirability to make responsible actions possible.
To what degree do engineers themselves feel that these three conditions are
fulfilled in their own daily practice? For answers to this question, we shall
turn to the interviews.
A. Actors and causality
Although, at first sight, it may seem a fairly straightforward matter, the
causality between actors and actions is often difficult to establish in the reality
of modern technology development. Not only do we find ourselves confront-
ed with the so-called problem of “many hands”, but more often than not, the
causal chain between action and consequence is hard to establish. One reason
has been mentioned already: the fact that modern technology development is
a multi-actor enterprise. But our respondents frequently pointed to another,
albeit related, reason. In the case of technology, there is inevitably a gap be-
tween the designer and the user of technology. Our respondents repeatedly
referred to this gap. In their view, they hardly “do” anything when it comes to
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the implementation of their research results. That’s all other people’s work:
“one cannot prevent improper use of one’s results”. Engineers only come up
with the instruments, others are responsible for the consequences of their
use. This is one important reason for the engineers’ belief that their individ-
ual responsibility for the possibly negative societal consequences of their
work is severely restricted.
However, exceptions to this view were reported. Some respondents did feel
that, in their line of research, it is quite possible to foresee how the outcomes
of their work will be used: “Everyone who does not live in an ivory tower
knows what use society will make of his work”. And as soon as a designer is
aware of what future use will be made of his or her instruments, s/he is co-re-
sponsible for this use to a certain degree. This view seems to correspond to
commonsense notions of responsibility: if I give a gun to a known killer, I am
co-responsible if s/he goes out to kill someone with it. Interestingly enough,
this is not the reason why some respondents are quite clear about their refusal
to work for the military, or why several other respondents said they try to
steer away from controversial research. On the contrary, this notion of co-re-
sponsibility is most often put forward in those cases where the respondents
feel the uses of their technologies are beneficial. Most technological designs
are developed with such beneficial goals in mind, and engineers are keen to
accept co-responsibility for these.
B. Freedom of design and of research into the consequences of the design
In the case of technology development, there can be more or less freedom to
perform two basic kinds of activity: () design work proper and () research
into the possible consequences if these technological designs become imple-
mented. Thus, in discussing the moral responsibility of engineers, we have to
distinguish between these two levels of freedom.
 According to our respondents, their freedom to design what they want is
limited. The reason for this is that they feel forced to seek collaboration with
business organisations and therefore to submit themselves, to a certain de-
gree, to commercial incentives and to the necessity to compete with market
parties. Although they feel market orientation curtails their academic free-
dom, they still seek collaboration with parties closer to the market for three
main reasons. The first reason is economic: business provides the funds nec-
essary to do research. But they also come up with less down-to-earth reasons.
Universities are not the only knowledge institutions in modern society. Firms
have vast research facilities, and the knowledge produced there is often only
 Tsjalling Swierstra and Jaap Jelsma
Inside the Politics of Technolo  24-06-2005  10:58  Pagina 208
accessible to academics through collaboration: “[by collaborating] you get
access to confidential information about what these companies are working
on”. Enhancing the practical relevance of academic research is a third goal
that counts in the collaboration with business organisations:“It is a matter of
mutual interest that universities, which are objective, and industry, which is
close to practical problems, collaborate. If not, you get irrelevant universities
and impractical standards”. Several respondents made it clear that they re-
gard an enlargement of the probability that their ideas will be put into prac-
tice as a substantial advantage of collaborating with business.
However, the perception of these advantages does not mean that our re-
spondents close their eyes to the potential reverse side of this coin. Collabora-
tion with business may be inevitable because of the benefits it offers, but this
does not mean that there are no costs. Two kinds of costs were repeatedly
mentioned. First, the need to collaborate decreases one’s scope for adopting a
principled, moral stance in those cases calling for such a stance: “There is an
increasing need for funds from outside the university. And then discussions
become more difficult. The need for money leaves little room for principles”.
Another respondent remarked that he would “lose his credit with external
financiers, and put an end to the collaboration” if he were to take a critical
stance. Second, to our respondents, the main criterion for success still re-
mained scientific relevance:“going purely for the money is despicable”. How-
ever, they saw this kind of scientific attitude as being different from the pri-
mary motivations of their business partners.
 How free do our respondents feel to invest time and money in finding out
about the future social and environmental consequences of their technologi-
cal innovations? Most respondents made it abundantly clear that neither the
university nor their business partners appeared to be much interested in early
assessments of the possible adverse consequences of their research activities.
Many of the respondents believed that the university’s lack of interest in this
matter is shown by the fact that it primarily pushes its employees toward sci-
entifically relevant output. As one respondent told us: “We work hard on the
technical side, but not on the social one. That should be taken up by the uni-
versity,but not by our department.We are already forced to swim very hard to
keep ourselves from drowning. In that respect, the world is very hard and
simple”. This is not to say that our respondents made the general impression
of suffering severely from this lack of stimulation.One characteristic quote il-
lustrates this as follows: “It will be very difficult to make funds available [for
looking into the consequences]. We have different priorities within our de-
partment. Education and research are in a tight spot as it is. And we do not
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want regulations and facilities at university level because, in the end, that only
swallows up the scarce funds”.
We conclude that the freedom of these engineer-designers is restricted on
two levels. First, they feel forced by financial and professional reasons to enter
into collaboration with business partners, restricting the possible avenues for
inquiry. Second, neither these business partners nor their direct employer is
perceived as being much interested in impact assessment along moral stan-
dards. Both push the engineer-designer in directions deemed commercially
and/or scientifically important. But it is not only a matter of pragmatic rea-
sons, i.e., funds and time, that discourages respondents from investing in im-
pact assessment. There are also more substantive arguments why they do not
systematically investigate the possible ethical, societal, and environmental
consequences of their technological work. This leads us to the third condi-
tion.
C. Knowledge of the consequences
Basically, the respondents came up with five more fundamental reasons why
they cannot collect valid knowledge about the consequences of their work.
First, the possible consequences of newly implemented technologies are too
manifold, too complex to be foreseen with any acceptable degree of certainty:
“Everything we do has social consequences”. Second, these consequences of-
ten take too much time to manifest themselves:“It is a major problem that, in
the long run, these consequences are unpredictable”. Third, more often than
not, desirable consequences are intrinsically linked to less desirable ones. If
you want the one kind, you simply have to accept the other: “Even if there
were military uses, I would not stop my research because it will simultaneous-
ly yield results that are crucially important for the medical sector”. Fourth –
and this is perhaps the most basic reason – it is, by definition, not the technol-
ogy developer who determines what the consequences will be, but the user of
the technology: “Yes, there are unintended consequences. But these do not
have much to do with the technology.You cannot influence them.After twen-
ty-five years, I still cannot fathom how the medical sector works. If we come
up with a cheaper technique, the result often is that the total costs go up be-
cause this technique is more often employed than before, and the physicians
can write out bills each time”. We have seen this type of argument before, in a
slightly different context. There the argument was that “user autonomy”
washes out the causality of those who designed the instruments and the con-
sequences of use. Here the point is different:“user autonomy”means that the
consequences of a new technique cannot be adequately known beforehand.
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Finally, the normative evaluation of probable consequences is said to remain
inevitably a matter of subjective taste: “What is deemed socially relevant is
also a matter of your political stance”.
Critical evaluation of the interview data
Which notion of moral responsibility issues from these deliberations by the
engineers themselves on the three basic conditions: causality, freedom to act,
and knowledge about the consequences? Let us take the three conditions one
at a time.We shall see that there is much that is convincing and that should be
taken into account to avoid moralism, as defined above. But there are also
some points that are less convincing, and some inconsistencies that should
make us stop in our tracks.
re A Reflecting on their remarks about causality, we see the interviewees hid-
ing behind their academic freedom when denying their responsibility for un-
foreseen negative consequences: they did not do anything possibly con-
tentious, the users are responsible. But when the technology turns out well,
they are the first to claim responsibility. Nevertheless, there is considerable
truth in these claims about causality (or lack of). However, this is not the
whole story. Whether an engineer can be considered as a moral actor, i.e.,
whether s/he can be held responsible for the use made of his or her designs,
depends to a large extent on the knowledge variable (that is condition B):
could s/he have foreseen these uses and therefore (some of) the consequences
of the technology s/he designed? In the interviews, respondents offered both
pragmatic and fundamental reasons for not being able to assess these uses
and consequences: no time and no money, and they even called this type of
foresight essentially impossible. In appraisal of this pragmatic argument, we
can say that it covers up the choice that is involved here: time and funds could,
in principle, have been used differently. With reference to the second, more
fundamental argument, it has been observed that, although it may indeed be
impossible to foresee all the consequences of a technological design, at least
some of these consequences can be anticipated.This is all the more so because
a technological artifact has a “script” (Akrich and Latour ), i.e., it pre-
scribes to some extent the uses that will be made of it. It should be noted that,
even if this specific feature of technological artifacts has now been sufficiently
established by the critics of the instrumentalist vision of technology, this vi-
sion remains dominant among engineers.
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re B Concentrating on their remarks about their own freedom of action, we
find that the engineers themselves point out what sociologists call “the net-
work character” of technology development. According to that conception,
individual engineers have a very restricted moral agency. Their practical op-
tions are severely limited by the fact that technology development is not a
matter of isolated individuals, but is essentially a complex, collective affair of
actors with conflicting agendas.
However, if we look a bit closer, there is something peculiar about the way
respondents describe the restrictions they feel bounded by. The restrictions
of their freedom to act within this network prove not to be a completely fixed
matter. Instead, these restrictions seem to be subject to negotiations, and to
have a gradual character. This gradual character becomes clear in remarks
like: “We only seek collaboration with business organisations on the condition
that this results in work that is scientifically relevant”. Thus,a rather remarkable
inconsistency seems to exist here. On the one hand, engineers refer to the net-
work character of modern technology development to deny moral responsi-
bility for their actions. On the other hand, these same restrictions are not
deemed compelling enough to overrule the classic and fundamental demand
of scientific relevance. Why then would it not be possible to refuse that same
collaboration if other, moral, demands would require this?
This inconsistency, however, can be explained in a sociological way, i.e., by
leaving the perspective of the actor and invoking structural factors that shape
engineering practice. In that perspective, it is easy to see that respondents are
part of two networks: they are part of a network in which business organisa-
tions play a major role. But they are also, and probably more fundamentally,
part of an academic network. In this latter network, their failure or success is
rated according to their scientific prestige, and hardly at all in terms of the
possible ethical content of their work – all the more so if that content is not
manifest at first sight.
re C Concerning the question to what degree, if at all, the future conse-
quences of new technologies can be predicted, we have seen how respondents
came up with five fundamental reasons why this is not the case or, at best, is
only the case to a very limited degree. Some of these reasons, however, are
more convincing than others. For example, the last argument – that any eval-
uation of these consequences will be subjective and contested – may be noth-
ing more than an old positivistic reflex: we can agree on hard facts, but not on
soft values. Be that as it may, this argument does not really contest that the
consequences themselves can in principle be foreseen, only that their desir-
ability may be a matter of subjective taste or political debate. The same holds
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for the argument that good and bad are sometimes inextricably entwined.
This is undoubtedly true, but it does not follow that these intricacies cannot
or should not be made visible in advance.So this leaves us with the other three
reasons why, according to the respondents, it is often impossible to predict
the probable consequences of new technologies: they are too complicated,are
too long-term, and are independent of the intentions of the designer and are
dependent on the future user.
Although we accept that there is considerable truth in these objections, we
do wish to point out a rather striking discrepancy between the respondents’
modesty when it comes to predicting risks on the one hand, and their willing-
ness to accept credit for success on the other. One plausible way of interpret-
ing this inconsistency is by pointing to the self-interest of our respondents.
They seem to manoeuvre for maximum autonomy combined with mini-
mum responsibility. They achieve this feat by alternating between the above-
mentioned restrictions if someone appeals to their moral responsibility, and
referring to their academic freedom when negotiating with business.
A brief case study: Designing biodegradable plastics
In this section, we describe the case of a technical design process that is rele-
vant because of the attention given to moral aspects in the course of the de-
sign activities.
At the end of the s, a new research group (Biomedical Materials) was
established within the Department of Macromolecular Chemistry at Twente
Technical University. The research topic of the new group was the design and
development of biodegradable polymer materials for medical use, e.g., liga-
ture threads and capsules for the delivery of drugs in the body. Such materials
have to meet conditions of controlled degradation. That is, they must have
vanished from the body within a fixed time span and should not leave health-
damaging debris. The latter objective can be realised by taking natural sub-
stances such as lactic and amino acids as a starting point for the design of
these medical products.
In contrast to the polymer chains applied in medicine, another polymer
material started to stir social concern in the s. Specific synthetic sub-
stances (“plastics”) widely in use for a range of applications, especially as
packing material, had become a major pollution problem. Being non-
biodegradable, they popped up everywhere in the environment as persistent
waste. Entrepreneurial scientists scented a market for biodegradable plastics.
However, the first attempts to develop such plastics from blends of starch (a
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natural polymer) and polypropylene were not very promising. Now and
then, the scientists at  played with the idea of searching for something bet-
ter by building on their expertise with biomedical materials, since these ma-
terials were completely biodegradable. The apparent societal need for
biodegradables might help to acquire the funding needed for additional re-
search. What held them back for a long time was the difference in markets.
Medical biopolymer products were technically sophisticated, expensive, and
were sold in niche markets at high prices. A biodegradable substance appro-
priate for use in all kind of packages had to be some kind of cheap bulk mate-
rial intended for a mass market. The biomedical materials were simply too
expensive for this kind of application.For that reason, the scientists in Twente
did not take action, but kept an eye on developments.
In , the visit to a scientific conference where “biodegradable materials
for the environment” were high on the agenda set the ball rolling. The re-
search group decided to undertake a serious research effort into the develop-
ment of a biodegradable plastic for bulk application. Since a study of this
kind of material did not fit into the regular research program, its develop-
ment had to be funded by external sponsors. Informal contacts that the group
maintained with industry indicated that polyethylene-terephthalate ()
was a promising candidate as a “raw” material.  already contains degrad-
able bonds, but degrades very slowly since it is very hydrophobic. By building
an easily hydrolizable substance into the  chain, the  scientists hoped to
lower the hydrophobia and to increase the biodegradability of . A quick
survey of the literature taught the research team that several substances
might prove appropriate, and that there were no patents excluding collabora-
tion with a partner in industry. In , two team members visited a large
chemical corporation that was known for researching . But for a number
of reasons, this firm was not interested in supporting the  team’s efforts to
make  biodegradable. Thus, funding had to be sought elsewhere. Six
months later, the “Polymer products and waste management program”
() offered a new opportunity.
, established in , was a multidisciplinary program for environ-
mental research funded by the  itself. Its objective was “to contribute to
possible solutions for the urgent environmental problems stemming from
the societal use of synthetic polymers”. Funding by  meant that a re-
search team had to undertake a critical assessment of the technological, socie-
tal and political implications of the polymers to be developed. This condition
stemmed directly from the  policy developed by the Board of the Univer-
sity (see above), now implemented through research programs such as
. The research group within Biomedical Materials successfully ap-
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plied for  funding on behalf of a project called “Biodegradable Poly-
mers to Reduce Polymer Waste”, which was started in the spring of . The
basic idea of this project – modifying  to turn it into a biodegradable sub-
stance – remained unchanged. However, the obligatory societal assessment
which was carried out after the first research year yielded an unexpected out-
come. The assumption about the environmental need for a biodegradable
plastic, on which the project had been built from the beginning, appeared to
be largely unfounded. In the policy-oriented literature, biodegradable plas-
tics were juxtaposed with more sustainable alternatives such as recycling or
re-use of packages. To be socially viable, biodegradable plastics would at least
have to prove their superiority over these alternatives in comparisons based
on robust environmental assessments such as life cycle analysis (). In the
Dutch National Policy Plans for the Environment (Nationale Milieubeleids-
plannen, NMPS), biodegradable plastics were not even mentioned as an op-
tion for alleviating waste problems. These outcomes came more or less as a
shock to the researchers involved with . They had always perceived
biodegradable plastics as a technical solution with a promise embraced by so-
ciety. Now it became gradually clear to them that they had only been cherish-
ing a vague dream of their own. To come true, this dream had to fit credibly
into a developing picture of sustainable waste policy and, to realise this fit, the
technical design needed a convincing story and the right performance.
Arguments underpinning and articulating the promise of  were devel-
oped in a book about  (Smits ). In an article about the role of
polymers in waste management, the  researchers carved out a niche for
their emerging product by recommending its use in applications ending in
waste streams that are hard to recycle, such as those produced by households.
After biodegradation, the remainder of such waste can be re-used as biomass
or, if degraded anaerobically, as methane. If natural substances can be built
into biodegradable polymer products, a neutral 

balance is within reach.
The authors coined the term “biological recyclability” for this kind of oppor-
tunity. Further, they sketched a scenario to underpin the economic viability
of large-scale use of biodegradable synthetic polymers in society. According
to the authors, this viability presupposes a world in which (i) exhaustion of
supplies has driven up oil prices sharply, (ii) the price of biodegradable syn-
thetics has fallen considerably due to increase in scale, (iii) the imposition of
taxes on waste favours the use of bio-recyclable products, and (iv) the pres-
ence of an adequate infrastructure enables the collection and processing of
organic waste. The authors admitted that to acquire a precise picture of the
contribution to the alleviation of waste problems, their option of biodegrad-
able polymers had to be tested against alternative solutions by carrying out
Trapped in the Duality of Structure
Inside the Politics of Technolo  24-06-2005  10:58  Pagina 215
s (Stapert et al. ). The  book was presented at a  workshop
(“Plastic Waste: A Technical or a Societal Problem?”) which was part of a se-
ries of  workshops.
In a presentation to a  conference (“The Moral Script in Technical De-
sign”) during the following year (), an effort was made to connect the
 project more closely with Dutch waste policy. The researchers agreed
that, as this policy stipulates, prevention and re-use of waste are the most de-
sirable options. For the remainder of the waste, the concept of biological re-
cycling had now been further articulated by comparing it with chemical and
mechanical recycling. The latter approaches both presuppose separation and
collection of different types of waste before recycling can occur. But bio-
degradable polymers, so the researchers stressed, need no separation from
the rest of the organic waste – such as that produced by households – before it
can be processed into compost. Another aspect of the societal embedding of
biodegradable plastics was their manufacturability. According to the  en-
gineers, the development of synthetic biodegradables should form the begin-
ning of a technological trajectory which may shift to the more favourable nat-
ural (i.e., renewable) polymers in later stages. They perceived commence-
ment with natural polymers as impossible, because processing these sub-
stances is too remote from current expertise and practice in the chemical in-
dustry.
An explicit design constraint resulting from the societal assessment of the
project was “compostability”, i.e., the biodegradable plastics must be degrad-
able into compost. Biodegradable plastics can be conceived as artifacts with
competing action programs. On the one hand, these plastics must be sturdy
for use as bags, covers, etc., whereas, on the other hand, they should quickly
weaken and disintegrate when discarded. The composting process can link
both programs by offering an accelerated breakdown of materials robust
enough for practical use as plastics.Moreover,compostability was required to
embed plastics in emerging regimes of processing organic household waste in
Dutch cities. These regimes produced compost as an end product. Both con-
siderations meant that the compostability of the biodegradable plastics un-
der development had to be tested. This demand required an extension of the
design process by the development of a definition of compostability and the
development of a standardised test methodology. These requirements were
realised by means of collaboration with a research institute at Wageningen
Agricultural University. In , the partners concluded a contract by which
Wageningen University committed itself to carrying out biodegradability
tests in exchange for support of the Ph.D. fellow in charge by the head of the
Biomedical Materials research group at the University of Twente.
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Evaluation of the case study
As with the interview data, we evaluated the case study against the chosen
preconditions for the attribution of ethical behaviour.
A. Actorship and causality
What kind of actions did the engineers carry out within the practice of the
project studied? These actions can be described in different ways. To begin
with, our chemical engineers attempted to synthesize new substances called
“biodegradable plastics”. As we showed, such substances have two contradic-
tory action programs, like safety belts and airbags in cars (Latour ). Cre-
ating this kind of dual substance is a complicated task requiring sophisticated
knowledge, experience, skills, tools and resources, a kind of heterogeneous
and connecting activity we call pure science.
At the same time, we can describe the actions of our engineers as entrepre-
neurial.What they do is attempt to make the knowledge and expertise of their
department – biopolymers for medical use – work in the new domain of envi-
ronmental technology. That is, they want to conquer new territory with new
ideas and new products and, in doing so, add value to the investments they
have already made.
Furthermore, our engineers hope to build a better society by means of
their professional activity. In this sense, there is also a moral incentive behind
their activities. By advertising their project, they seem to indicate some kind
of responsibility for the unwanted effects of previous endeavours by chemical
engineers, that is, the construction of non-degradable plastics, which have
become an environmental nuisance. At this point, we should realise that it is
quite possible, even probable, that this responsibility for the waste problem is
more easily assumed if the development of a technical solution to that prob-
lem can be turned into a promising new project from which benefits can ac-
crue. In this sense, some of the opportunism we noticed earlier in the inter-
views may become manifest here too.
Having discussed the actions, we turn to the causality. In the interviews,
the engineers expressed ambivalence on this point. They considered it rather
unpredictable which use “society”might make of research outcomes, but not
completely unpredictable. In an earlier section, we speculated that this ambi-
guity has to do with the networks in which the engineers participate in order
to realise their designs; that is, to figure them out, to articulate and develop
them, and to make them work. Thus, the engineers construct causality them-
selves, but they are not the only constructors. Their actions are shaped and
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framed by, and attuned to, those of other actors with whom they share net-
works of collaboration. Indeed, the making of modern technology is a very
specialised, multi-actor undertaking (Rip et al. ; Rip and Kemp ).
The current idea among sociologists of technology is that different collectives
of actors participating in the development of a specific piece or field of tech-
nology are linked up by an “innovation chain” or rather – to borrow a more
dynamic and iterative concept – by “techno-economic networks” (Callon et
al. ). Such networks link activities in science, industry and the market. It
is a major goal of modern technology policy to construct such networks, or to
close the gaps in them. Causality develops gradually in such networks, while
none of the actors is in full control of this development (Elzen et al. ).
When we look at the practice as revealed by the case study, it becomes clear
how the actions of the engineers acquire a sense of direction. The network(s)
in which they operate function(s) as incentive structures shaping their ac-
tions and giving them significance in both a cognitive and a social sense.
Within the science pole of the network in which our engineers work, the rul-
ing paradigm inspires the course of action in making the new artifacts, i.e.,
the chemical substances called “biodegradable plastics”. The main direction
is clear – combine aliphatic hydrophilic carbohydrates with hydrophobic
aromatic ones in a polyester molecule to realise the dual “action program” of
the molecule. The precise composition of the chain has to be discovered:
which groups should be linked, what length the chain should have. That is
what most of the experimentation, i.e., the engineering action, is about. To
determine these details, the engineers derive ideas from their own experience,
from their colleagues within the research team and those they meet at confer-
ences, and from the scientific literature. In other words, they tap the science
(part of the) network.But they know that to make their molecules work in so-
ciety, these have to be processed into products on a mass scale. It is quite clear
that they lack the resources and skills to do that themselves. In fact, they have
no equipment to test their molecules for this purpose. Therefore, actors in in-
dustry are needed – another (part of the) network. To interest these actors
and to link them to their project, the molecules in question have to meet cer-
tain requirements. Our engineers assume that they have to offer a substance
that is easy and cheap to produce on a large scale, a bulk product, otherwise
their molecule will have no chance. This also requires research effort because
the biomedical polymers with which they are familiar are expensive and can
only be sold in niche markets (hospitals). Further beyond, that is, beyond in-
dustry and its supposed demands, there lies a “society” in which the
biodegradable molecules might eventually be used. Our engineers have the
idea that their molecules hold a promise for solving, or at least mitigating, the
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waste problem that “society” is wrestling with, but this idea is only a very
vague one. It is based on a very general and unchecked scenario announcing
that waste problems due to plastics will aggravate to the extent that “society”
will embrace any biodegradable plastic as soon as it can be produced.
Thus, there is a sense of causality in making biodegradable plastic right
from the beginning. This is inevitable, of course, otherwise there would be no
project. However, the more the distance from the science pole – the work-
place of our engineers – increases, the more the articulation of this causality
declines. Our engineers are quite capable of explaining in detail those mole-
cules that will probably work in “technical” terms. However, with regard to
the question as to how such molecules will be adopted into society and how
they will work in “social”terms, the engineers only have vague answers. In the
interviews, there was some speculation about the reason for such difference
in articulation, in the sense that the structure at the science pole lacks incen-
tives to elaborate the “social side”. Indeed, the case study makes clear that the
primary concerns of the engineers are the originality of their findings and the
possibility of protecting them by a patent. In the next sections, we shall see
that as soon as the incentive structure becomes more rewarding in this re-
spect, investments will be made to also cover the “social” part of the venture,
with stunning outcomes.
B. Freedom of design and the societal effects of research
In the interviews, the engineers emphasised that the financial need to collab-
orate with industry constitutes a severe limitation of their academic freedom:
“the need for money leaves little room for principles”. This quote suggests that
industry more or less dictates the kind of research that academic research
teams should perform. Our case study did not confirm this situation. It is
rather the other way around, in the sense that our researchers tried (in vain)
to enroll firms in an academic project. The mainsprings of this initiative were
entrepreneurial incentives mixed with some principles, and encouragement
from the outcome of a feasibility study allied to some initial interest from the
side of industry. The case study alone does not prove, of course, that this kind
of development pattern is a general one, but it does suggest that the state-
ments on this point in the interviews are questionable.
The second aspect of freedom we distinguished is the freedom to investi-
gate the societal effects of the research being carried out; that is, to undertake
efforts directed at impact assessment. In the interviews, the engineers provid-
ed strong opinions about this point: the research context does not welcome,
let alone reward, the assumption of a moral stance on a project. Consequent-
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ly, there is a lack of incentives and resources for activities aiming at impact as-
sessment. This situation is taken as the reason why engineers “work hard on
the technical side [of a research project], but not on the social side”.
Such opinions can primarily be explained from the engineers’ entrepre-
neurial role. The case study shows that, to keep the project alive, the engineers
have to sell it to sponsors. In this pursuit of resources, the natural tendency is
to emphasise the promise of biodegradable polymers. Falsifying this prom-
ise, i.e., inquiring into the “negative social consequences” of these polymers,
would be counterproductive. In addition, the engineers’ distinction in the
project between the “technical” and “social” aspects of their work on
biodegradables is remarkable. This kind of duality in their discourse seems to
indicate that they may not be aware of the fact that their technical activities
shape a social reality through a developing causality as sketched above. That
is, they help to create a society in which biodegradability makes the use and
the jettisoning of plastics on a massive scale even more attractive. Another
possibility is that polymer engineers are more or less aware of this, but their
opinions refer to a difference in degree of articulation regarding the various
kinds of research activities, as we explained earlier. That is, research on mat-
ters of societal impact (how the desirability of biodegradable plastics precise-
ly relates to existing priorities in waste policy,etc.) suffers from a lack of atten-
tion and resources, compared with molecular research itself, and therefore
these matters remain vague. The concern about such societal questions is del-
egated to industry, which is “closer to the practical problems”. Our engineers
seem to have a division of labour in mind: we deliver a cheap bulk polymer,
they dream up the applications for they know the market! This is indeed a di-
vision of labour leaving our engineers a maximum of room to manoeuvre.
The establishment of the university-sponsored  program changed
this incentive structure significantly. In the framework of this program, the
polymer engineers were seriously engaged in impact assessment, since the
program required this as one of the conditions of receiving funds. Now they
have to elaborate their vague scenario of future developments in societal
waste management. In the effort to articulate their ideas, they discovered that
the world outside academia is different from what they thought.
C. Knowledge about the societal effects
Again referring to the interviews, we recall that the engineers interviewed
mentioned five reasons that more or less made the exploration of the conse-
quences of their design work impossible. On the basis of these data, we might
expect the engineers to protest against the impossible task placed on their
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shoulders by the  program requirement to assess the societal conse-
quences of their technical project on degradable polymers.Strangely enough,
they do not protest. Within the practice of the  project, the engineers
dug into the future quite zealously instead of sitting back and complaining
about the complexities of the “social”world.On the one hand, they forecasted
a world in which their biodegradable polymer would find a niche and would
have opportunities. In this scenario, the engineers do not shrink back from
predicting the development of different kinds of socio-economic factors in
the long term, from oil supplies to green taxes. They also mapped out a tech-
nological route within which the development of biodegradable plastics
could be imagined to take place, and they emphasised the advantages of bio-
logical recycling (i.e., not requiring separation of waste) compared with the
alternatives of the moment, i.e., chemical and mechanical recycling, that rank
higher in political terms. The consequence of this scenario is that biodegrad-
able plastics should be compostable, that is, the design requirements
changed. As a consequence, the network around the project had to expand to
include partners (found at Wageningen University) able to realise this socie-
tal inscription in the molecule.
In other words, our engineers do not try to predict the manifold and long-
term consequences of their technology, i.e., of the molecules they had con-
structed. This would indeed be an impossible task. Instead, they develop an
educated forecast of the social world that the technical concept of biodegrad-
able plastic is expected to meet, and they adapt the molecular design accord-
ingly. Thus they do not sit passively, simply leaving the fate of their molecules
to unpredictable “users” in society. Which means that our engineers are not
only acting as technical engineers “only constructing molecules”, but they are
also acting as social engineers.
Discussion and conclusions
In the interviews we have analysed, scientists refer to constraining structural
factors as a primary cause for the lack of agency they experience in matters of
social responsibility related to their research. That is, our scientists do not
consider themselves as autonomous seekers of truth. In morally accounting
for their actions as researchers, they rather take their environment as a refer-
ence. The way in which they describe the restrictions they experience in be-
having responsibly comes close to the picture that modern sociology of sci-
ence draws of the modern scientist, namely, as an actor whose agency is en-
abled and constrained by structure, i.e., by the technical frames (Bijker a)
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and the networks s/he needs for the “co-production”(Rip et al. ),“realisa-
tion” (Radder ) or “construction” of techno-scientific (arti)facts (Latour
and Woolgar ). In the relationships referred to by the scientists inter-
viewed, commercial sponsors appear as the dominant actors to be taken into
account, with users being regarded as determining the final effects of techni-
cal designs. It is remarkable that the interviewees apparently perceive these
actors, especially the users, as being much more autonomous in their actions
– that is, less constrained by structure – than they themselves in their role as
scientists. Consequently, they attribute to these actors more responsibility for
the impact of technology than they are willing to take themselves.
Though it is clear that research is to be carried out in an “impure” world
where the scientist has to keep the low company of commercial interests, our
interviewees stick to formulating their mission as “pure research”. A kind of
purification seems to be going on here enabling the immaculate scientist to
make the vulgar allies responsible as soon as the outcomes of joint efforts be-
come a social problem. As to becoming knowledgeable about the societal ef-
fects of their professional activities, the engineers feel equally constrained.
The character of the restrictions they mention corresponds closely with the
outcomes of analyses made in the field of technology studies, such as the
recognition of a control dilemma inherent in the assessment of social effects of
technology (see e.g., Collingridge ). Moreover, as far as these effects can
be assessed at an early stage, the interviewees perceive no incentives spurring
them to do so within their professional academic environment. The engi-
neers interviewed meet the issue of their social responsibility with a mixture
of fatalism and opportunism.Their argument on which this attitude rests can
be summarised as follows: in our professional environment, the structural con-
ditions to behave responsibly are not fulfilled, so we cannot be moral actors.
Where things go wrong, we cannot be held accountable.
We appreciate the engineers’ account as an adequate assessment of the
moral position of today’s individual scientist. It leads us to the conclusion
that the three basic preconditions for the attribution of moral responsibility
do not apply in the situation of the present-day individual scientist. To force
such responsibility on these scientists individually would indeed lead to
moralism.However,by accepting this conclusion, the engineers would escape
too easily. When we look through the lens of the case study at the actual be-
haviour of the scientists, they do not appear quite so helpless. In developing
biodegradable polymers, the engineers do not seem to play their modern role
as entrepreneurial co-producers of technology in a reluctant manner. On the
contrary, they tend to play it actively and emphatically. Indeed, this means
that they are not individual truth seekers but dedicated team workers and
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network builders. This is the very role that society expects nowadays from,
and attributes to, the workers at the science pole of the modern “knowledge
infrastructure”. In fact, playing the entrepreneurial role well could be con-
ceived as a major characteristic of the societal responsibility of the modern
scientist. Knowledge workers at the science pole are supposed to come up
with a constant stream of new ideas and to make these ideas work by inscrib-
ing them into hardware (in our case, into specific molecules), by attracting
funds, and by building new alliances. However, in order to create any room to
manoeuvre and to raise funds, the inscriptions to be made should have at
least some credibility of future pay-off for both the scientists themselves and
for other investors. For that reason, a narrative is developed that includes
promises about and forecasts of future effects – such as “reducing the waste
problem” – to be realised by the new (but still fictive) molecules. Such prom-
ises and forecasts build a “prospective structure” guiding further action and
resource building (Van Lente and Rip ). Thus, despite the fact that antici-
pations of societal effects are qualified as inherently difficult if not impossible
in the interviews, the scientists do speak out about such effects as a precondi-
tion for creating this kind of prospective structure. However, the social effects
suggested as issuing from the new research path of biodegradable plastics are
very imprecise. Moreover, these promises are constructed in a narrow setting
(the science pole), and their reliability is not checked against the wisdom of
external experts by broadening the network towards relevant policy circles.
In other words, politics within science (the technical inscriptions made in
conjunction with the local narrative justifying these inscriptions) is discon-
nected from the wider societal politics.We suppose that this is the normal way
of shaping social responsibility as it occurs in modern scientific practice, but
it is a rather narrow-minded and not very productive one. For as long as the
moral promises and forecasts about desirable social effects of research con-
ceived at the science pole are not embedded in the views and actions of other
actors crucial for “realisation” or “co-production” – i.e., as long as they are
kept “pure”– they will never fulfil their sweet-sounding prophecies.
Appraising the tension between what our chemical engineers say and what
they do, we might conclude that they are trapped in the duality of structure
(Giddens ). The very structures they build and reify as a frame for their
entrepreneurial agency are experienced by these same scientists as given con-
straints shackling their social responsibility. Because of this hidden duality,
the science pole seems to (dis)function as a morally unreflective, reproduc-
tive Boudonian system lacking feedback from its environment. Such systems
can begin to learn and to transform when they start to generate a certain level
of aggression in their environment (Boudon ).
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The establishment of a collaborative agreement between the research
group of the Technical Physics Department and Urenco (see section ) did
trigger such aggression. The Department, and the Board of the University in
its wake, came under moral pressure to re-assess research goals because of the
possibly unwanted societal effects (military applications of laser enrichment
of uranium). The change of institutional rules for internal funding of re-
search projects resulting from this clash created an incentive structure more
favourable to moral agency at the research team level. The addition of a socie-
tal assessment clause to project funding conditions had a profound influence
on the further development of the polymer project at the network building
level as well as with regard to the technical content of the project. After a seri-
ous exploration of Dutch waste policy in relation to the idea of making plas-
tics biodegradable, the rationale of the project became much more articulat-
ed and changed considerably, as appears from the article in the book about
.Accordingly, the project was steered away from mere biodegradabil-
ity towards compostability of plastics, an aim which fitted much better into
current waste policy. In turn, this socio-technical change required changes in
network building around the project. The research team no longer aimed at
establishing relations with large firms to develop a bulk product, but became
interested in small firms exploring niche markets for compostable plastic
products like waste bags instead. To test the compostability of the prototypes
of the molecules designed, the team initiated collaboration with a research
group at another university. In other words, due to the change in rules, the sci-
ence pole started to be more sensitive to its environment, became morally reflex-
ive about its research aims and about the resulting molecular inscriptions, and
recruited different allies. Moreover, it articulated a much more realistic sce-
nario about the future world in which its research product would function –
i.e., more in agreement with the agendas of crucial partners for further devel-
opment – than before. Finally, politics within science became connected and
attuned to wider societal politics.
Though the perceptions and concerns of practitioners with regard to the
bounds of modern technoscience enterprise should be taken seriously, they
do not force us to conclude that we should dismiss the notion of the engi-
neer’s individual moral responsibility. Rather, a sociologically informed way
of studying engineering practice helps to reveal the particular moments and
particular characteristics of practice at which and by which the conditions to
execute this individual responsibility are favourable or limiting.We have ten-
tatively demonstrated this by examining the normal practice of engineers in
an analysis of their perceptions as made clear in interviews, and in an investi-
gation of their real actions in a case study. The outcome of this analysis is that
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engineers simultaneously strategically operate within and refer to the struc-
tural (i.e., network-like) character of their practice as a ground for shifting
moral responsibility to others. Our own conclusion is different; namely, that
recognition of this structural character opens new options for agency regard-
ing the responsibility of engineers.
At the same time,we do not deny that, for individual engineers, it is difficult
to realise these options on their own. The  experience shows that to
create incentives for engineers to assume social responsibility, the individual
engineer level has to be transcended, and initiatives for policy making have to
be taken at the institutional and societal level.Thus,reflection and research on
how engineers can contribute to the shaping of institutions, procedures and
instruments that allow the social assessment of specific design activities, and
the democratic deliberation upon these, should be part and parcel of engi-
neering ethics. On the institutional level at the science pole (the part of tech-
no-economic networks that is the focus of our analysis), one could imagine
initiatives to be taken such as:
– creating funds at the university or faculty level for the assessment of proj-
ects expected to have considerable and/or ambivalent societal impact
– developing best practice methodologies for supporting engineering scien-
tists in carrying out such assessments at the research team level (Jelsma
and Van de Poel )
– evaluating experiences with assessment practice at the faculty level from
time to time 
– striving for diversity and richness of networks around design projects.
Further suggestions can be found in the literature about constructive and in-
teractive forms of technology assessment (Rip et al. ). For research teams
in industry, suggestions for impact analysis and tools for network manage-
ment and social learning have been described by Deuten et al. (). Project
managers directing radical innovations can turn to the Socrobust approach
for help in revealing the kinds of social environment presupposed by such in-
novations (Larédo et al. ). Further steps taken to enhance the social ac-
countability of firms could provide leverage at the research team level at the
science pole, too, but discussing such mechanisms is beyond the scope of this
study.With respect to any such assessment initiatives taken, it is important to
stress that they should not be restricted to the societal impact of technical de-
sign projects but should also include the contingent framing of the design ac-
tivity within networks and their related issues such as access, openness, diver-
sity, ownership, etc.
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The foregoing considerations lead us to the following conclusions. First,
structural conditions for taking individual moral responsibility in the nor-
mal practice of engineering at the science pole can be developed and realised,
but engineering ethicists pay little attention to this course of action because
of their pre-occupation with exceptional cases, i.e., cases of whistle blowing.
Second, such structural conditions can only be created by initiatives at higher
structural levels, that is, above the work floor of engineering where practising
engineers are not the primary actors. However, this does not mean that engi-
neers are powerless in this respect. In our view, they are free to urge such ini-
tiatives in a timely manner. That is, our study constructs a second-order re-
sponsibility for engineers, one that urges them to strive actively for the cre-
ation of conditions on the engineering work-floor that enable the assump-
tion of moral responsibility by individual engineers.
Notes
 Compare for example: Martin and Schinziger (). This much-used book de-
fines engineering ethics as () the study of the moral issues and decisions con-
fronting individuals and organisations involved in engineering; and () the study
of related questions about moral conduct, character, policies, and relationships of
people and corporations involved in technological activity (p. ; also quoted in
Lynch and Kline , ).
 See, for example, Duff () or Velasquez (). But any other textbook will
roughly give the same conditions, albeit phrased differently or with a different em-
phasis.
 Compare, for example,Velasquez ().A lot of debate centres on the question of
whether a person is always responsible if these four conditions are met. For exam-
ple, if I freely and knowingly cause my competitor to go bankrupt, am I morally re-
sponsible for his or her misery? However, there is considerably less disagreement
on the opposite question: Can one be held responsible if one or more of these con-
ditions is not met? In everyday reality, we seem to agree that in that case, we do not
hold a person responsible for her or his deeds and their consequences. However,
more often than not, it is a matter of degree as to how far these ideal conditions are
met: you co-caused the action, you foresaw some of the consequences, you had
some freedom to perform the actions (or not), etc. This means that responsibility
is often not completely annihilated when conditions are not perfectly met, but
mitigated. However, the mitigating power of circumstances is itself a matter of rel-
ative weight: if the consequences of our acting (or not) are very serious or severe, a
simple reference to our lack of foresight will often not do: even if you did not fore-
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see the consequences, this does not lift your responsibility because you should have
known.
 Compare Vaughan () who shows that, in fact, there was no clear opposition
between engineers and management. This opposition was construed afterwards to
fit the prevailing conceptions of the professional responsibility of engineers.
 As the rest of our article indicates, our contention is that networks do have agency
in the sense that they enable and constrain the moral agency of the individuals
they connect, but they have no moral agency. Of course, networks, institutions and
organisations can be made responsible – as Shell was made responsible by Green-
peace for its intention to sink the Brentspar – but this is a pragmatic solution to the
practical difficulty of pinpointing responsible individuals in complex network-
like settings.
 The suggestion made here can be further supported on the basis of outcomes from
an evaluation study in which one of us participated. From this study – on the
spending of governmental funds to research groups in the field of agricultural
biotechnology – it appeared that most of these research groups had regular con-
tact with a circle of clients from industry who consulted them about new direc-
tions and findings in academic research, as an input for the development of new
product ideas.“Not only the small firms hunt us for new product ideas.You would
be astonished to know how many big firms are milking us dry by inquiring about
which new products they should develop,”one researcher told the evaluators 
(Enzing et al. ).
 Such expectations about the social role of scientists are revealed by occasional
complaints from Dutch politicians about the lack of entrepreneurial spirit among
academics. For instance, at the launch of a governmental program to support in-
novative start-up firms in biotechnology in early  (to the value of € mil-
lion), the Minister of Economic Affairs blamed the perceived Dutch arrears in
biotechnology for this academic laxity.
 To give an example of at least some diversity, the Energy Research Centre of the
Netherlands () does much contract research work for the innovation- and
market-oriented Ministry of Economic Affairs, propagating and implementing
“green energy”. In ,  also carried out a study for Greenpeace, to investigate
how green “green energy”really is.
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